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Introduction  
 
 
Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the 
“master’s voice.” 
  - George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 1947 (574) 
 
 
During the earliest and most frigid years of the Cold War, 1947-1953, the 
overwhelming majority of America‟s media and public opinion promoted the idea that 
Soviet society was something close to a complete “dystopia.” Life in the land of Stalin 
was said to be fraught with terror, stifling conformity, mental and physical regimentation, 
and, for many, slavery and extermination. For Americans, no charges concerning the 
“cradle to grave” control over Soviet citizens seemed too outlandish or horrifying to be 
believed. In fact, by 1947, the thought of being made subject to the “ghoulish” rule of the 
Kremlin had become the American nightmare. 
The obsessive “better dead than red” mentality which pervaded this era is a 
curious phenomenon. The United States emerged victorious from the Second World 
War with half the gross national product of the planet, an enormous newly-built military 
establishment, and a public prepared for a period of sustained economic expansion. 
What cause could there be for concern in such happy circumstance? Where was the 
setting for an “age of anxiety,” an intense fear and loathing for its recent wartime ally? 
To be sure, some of the ghastly tales concerning life in the USSR had considerable 
foundation in fact, but why were such stories so pervasive, so sensationalized and 
(except on the political left) so completely one-sided? 
Previous studies of American anti-Soviet sentiment have focused primarily on 
American perceptions and fears concerning the Soviet external threat or on hostility 
toward domestic Communism (the amount of material on McCarthyism alone could fill a 
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small library). This essay will take a somewhat different approach by examining 
Americans‟ most commonly held perception of day-to-day life in the USSR: that modern 
methods of thought control and terror had transformed the Russian people into an 
enslaved mob of subservient, dull, and militaristic robots. To present this dominant 
image of life in Stalin‟s Russia and to demonstrate its pervasiveness, I will draw on 
mass-circulation periodicals, movies, television programs, popular literature, widely-read 
writings of professionals in various fields, the statements of those who influenced 
domestic opinion and foreign policy, and public opinion polls. These sources reveal 
identifiable “nightmare” themes that help explain America's pervasive anti-Communism 
during the early postwar period. Most notably, evidence suggests that Americans were 
generally much less optimistic about the future of their own society than many scholars 
have assumed
1
, and that the nation‟s obsessive, paranoiac anti-Soviet imagery was in 
large part a product of domestic problems and anxieties that pre-occupied the American 
people in the late 1940s. 
 
Historical Background 
Prior to the onset of the Cold War, American attitudes toward Soviet Russia 
ranged from intense hostility, especially following the 1917 Revolution and Stalin‟s 
purges of the 1930‟s, to a cautiously friendly „marriage of convenience‟ during World 
War II. Both traditional American culture and contemporary social tensions were crucial 
in fanning the flames of the early anti-Soviet sentiment. Individualism, regarded as the 
most basic of American values—along with the accompanying concern for civil liberties 
and property rights—was disdained by the Reds in Moscow who emphasized collective 
rather than individual action. Still, as Robin Fillmore writes in her recent dissertation, 
Transforming the “Enemy”, “the Soviet Union did not emerge from World War II as a 
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ready-made enemy of the United States. The wartime ally was reconstructed over a 
period of years…. As a symbol for the Soviet regime, war-time Stalin was [initially] 
reconstructed as a „good guy‟ in the fight against Hitler” (Fillmore 10). 
As the war‟s end drew nearer, however, tensions increasingly replaced the 
cordiality of this alliance of expediency, and the World War II image of the “brave 
Russians” again began to sour. In April 1945, President Roosevelt‟s successor, Harry 
Truman, quickly demonstrated a tougher policy in dealing with the Soviets. At the 
Potsdam Conference in July, Truman and Stalin exchanged verbal blows over Soviet 
actions in Eastern Europe, where the Russians soon imposed undemocratic pro-Soviet 
governments in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and (with Tito‟s 
assistance) Yugoslavia. The temporary division of Germany following Hitler‟s defeat 
looked more and more permanent as the victors failed to agree on how to handle the 
question of reparations. In February 1946, Stalin spoke of an irreconcilable conflict 
between the world‟s Communist and Capitalist nations, and three months later, in 
Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill spoke of an “iron curtain” across Central Europe. 
The opening guns of the Cold War had fired. 
Within a year and a half after the end of World War II, the harsh realities of the 
postwar world shattered Americans‟ optimistic wartime image of the Russians; in this 
milieu, the United States opted for a “get tough” policy of active resistance to the 
ambitions of its rival superpower. On March 12, 1947, President Truman went before a 
joint session of Congress to promulgate the Truman Doctrine which officially 
acknowledged Washington‟s new containment policy and formalized the Cold War. 
Not surprisingly, negative attitudes from previous decades burst forth once again. 
Most prominent among these was the image of Soviet life as similar to a vast 
concentration camp in which the will of the individual had been totally crushed as the 
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Russian people were reduced to mere slaves of a few fanatical masters. During the 
early postwar period, however, this vision became much more virulent and widespread 
and was joined by a host of new characterizations of life under Stalin—significantly 
different in content from those of the past. 
 
“The Country of the Blind” 
Americans became increasingly convinced that in the USSR, as nowhere else in 
history, the state had taken everything under its control. This was said to be the result of 
a system which placed society ahead of the individual. Using twentieth-century 
technology to full advantage, Stalin and the Politburo were charged with replacing the 
Government in Russia with a “machine” which “instinctively [thought] in terms of force,” 
to smash opposition, build its own power base and generally “push people around” 
(Atkinson 85). This brutal state apparatus was widely viewed as having gone so far that 
it had gained almost complete control not only of human actions, but of human thoughts 
as well (Counts and Lodge 158).   
After World War II, publications on Russian life devoted unprecedented attention 
to the alleged measures taken by Soviet leaders to establish mind control over their 
subjects. As more and more Americans were discovering in magazines such as 
Reader’s Digest, Time, Life and Collier’s, all forms of mass communication in the USSR 
fell under the “absolute control” of the Kremlin and the Communist Party. The Soviet 
Ministry of Propaganda and Agitation, Howard Metz explained, ran everything, including 
radio and television, newspaper, journal and book publishing, the film industry, and the 
fine arts. Each sector or level of this Ministry, throughout the USSR, was closely 
scrutinized by the next higher party unit until the top of the pyramid was reached at the 
Central Administration. Allegedly, the informer, the government official, the Ministry of 
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Internal Affairs (MVD) agent, and the party member all worked together with great 
effectiveness to ensure purity in any areas of communication which had not been 
sanitized ahead of time by the Ministry. At every stage, Americans reported, those 
responsible had to keep their eyes focused on Joseph Stalin and such “Politburo 
pundits” as Molotov and Zhadnov as “the final authority on everything” (Metz and 
Thomson 199, 203, 209). Punishments of job loss, public disgrace, forced labor, exile, 
or death were said to have been dished out to deviants (Inkeles 36-37).  
By mid-century, Americans had come to view the Soviet “octopus” of mind 
control as so vast and all-embracing that it had achieved (or nearly achieved) its alleged 
goal of turning the Soviet people into hordes of absolute conformists willing to bend to 
the Leader‟s every order. This was a theme repeated over and over again in American 
media and popular culture. 
On his immensely popular early fifties television program Life Is Worth Living—
“sponsored by God” and by the Admiral Corporation (and watched by 20 to 25 million 
viewers each week)—Bishop Fulton J. Sheen labeled the root cause of this 
regimentation as the Soviet system‟s absolute suffocation of liberty. “Liberty for them 
exists only when the citizens desire what the state desires, and do what the dictators 
order, and think only what the Party thinks,” he said. “Such is the liberty of dogs under 
the leash of their masters, and the liberty of cuckoos in cuckoo clocks, or the liberty of 
prisoners in prison” (Sheen quoted in MacDonald 129). 
American media sources frequently noted that well over one million personnel 
made up the Soviet political police, the MVD. This organization, rated as “the best 
housed, fed and clothed forces in the Union,” was also portrayed as the most wicked. 
Feared by even high Soviet officials, the MVD—with its hidden microphones, torture 
chambers, and concentration camps—recognized no inalienable human rights and 
  7 
answered to no one but the top Kremlin hierarchy. “Its sleuths infiltrate the domestic 
population at every angle,” insisted one of the reports, “from the topside down into each 
local party segmentation, armed unit, factory, office, collective farm and apartment and 
more than possibly one‟s own family.” Indeed, according to Collier’s, every five Russian 
families had at least one agent watching them day and night. In an atmosphere that was 
“always tense and cautious” people were afraid even to talk to one another. “The 
helpless masses”, so the account went, never knew which of the neighbors might turn 
out to be an informer, for everyday somebody would be arrested “to vanish into the 
unknown” (“Preview” in Collier’s 38). The same journal explained that 22,000,000 
Russians (equivalent to more than half the number of adult males living in the USSR in 
1950) had been condemned to Nazi-like slave camps (Nevins 80). And Reader’s Digest 
stated that citizens were subjected to these “living hells” for any minor aberration—
including “forgetting to salt the food” or “selling lemonade” (Eastman 140-141). As one 
“witness” in Eastern Europe told America magazine in 1947: “More and more the people 
I know are disappearing. They have heard the knock on the door at night” (Drake 601). 
Joanne P. Sharp‟s study Condensing the Cold War: Reader‟s Digest and 
American Identity (2000), finds that during the twentieth century, the number of Digest 
articles about the Soviet Union or communism reached a peak in the 1950-1953 period 
(180, or more than six times the number appearing in the pre-1946 issues) and that the 
picture presented after the end of World War II was much more “uniformly negative” 
than at earlier times (84-85). Sharp writes that characterizations of the Russian people 
evoked ugliness, slavery, mechanization, or dullness (85, 101). Soviet women were 
described in the Digest’s pages as having a “plodding submissiveness, more animal-like 
than human” and as “a sexless lot, indistinguishable from sacks of cement, flour or rags” 
(Kirk 143). General Malenkov, meanwhile, was portrayed as fat, having an “extremely 
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repulsive” face and, ultimately, as the “machine that walks like a man” (Sharp 101). In 
the USSR, the Digest reported with regularity, “there is no room… for mental 
independence. The only way to survive is to conform” (Alexiev 15).  These portrayals 
are especially significant given that the Digest was the highest-circulation general-
interest magazine in the United States (Sharp xiv). 
 The Bowman Gum Company played its part in the Cold War by releasing “Fight 
the Red Menace” trading cards in 1951. Along with the gum, when American kids 
opened a package they found cards displaying hideous portraits of the Kremlin 
hierarchy, their faces painted green, sketches of the secret police arresting terrified 
Russian families, and of Soviet slave labor camps. Card #72 “Olga and Ivan” read:  
 
A knock at the door—and the typical Russian family fears the worst. 
They are told where to work, where to live and what subjects they 
must master at school. Their daily routine insists on absolute 
obedience to their leaders and following Communist doctrine. A 
simple anti-communist remark by anyone of them could result in a 
visit by the police. An explanation will be demanded. Prison without 
fair trial or appeal faces all. This is life under Communism! FIGHT 
THE RED MENACE! (Barson and Heller 110-11) 
 
“All over the world,” another card explained, “agents of the Red Menace seek chances 
to make trouble. They even fool well-meaning people into helping them do their dirty 
work” (Buckingham 73). Throughout the popular media, the Soviets were typically 
portrayed as militant, deceitful and cruel. They stirred up revolutions, craved power and 
lived in a godless, gray, regimented world. Worst of all, these miserable Russians 
intended to remake the rest of the planet in their own dismal image. 
The degree to which the Russian-as-submissive-robot image had entrenched 
itself in the American mind was demonstrated in a 1948 American Legion “docudrama” 
portraying the Soviet takeover of a Mid-Western town. Following a cartoon invasion of 
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Europe by goose-stepping Red Army soldiers, a narrator breaks in to describe footage 
of even more ominous developments: 
 
Ah, but this is Europe you say? But let‟s see what can happen 
elsewhere, in say the small town of Mosinee, Wisconsin. [We see a 
tranquil street scene]. Peaceful, isn‟t it? But the Red trenchant falls 
and the chief of police is hustled off to jail. Next, public utilities are 
seized by fifth columnists. Watch carefully what happens to an editor 
who operates under a free press. He goes to jail too and his 
newspaper is confiscated—exit freedom of thought. Yes, this is life 
under the Soviet form of government. 
 
We are then shown another series of clips with now stone-faced citizens of Mosinee 
raising a Red (“Soviet States of America”) Star and portrait of Stalin over city hall, 
standing in soup lines, and marching mechanically down the town‟s streets carrying 
“Stalin is The Leader” and “The Communist Party is the Only Party” signs—their right 
arms raised in obedient salute. Utterly drained of their humanity, the poor Mosinians 
look as if they would be better off dead (except perhaps for one woman who somehow 
managed to hang on to her mink stole and jewelry). In an emotionally-charged voice, the 
narrator signs off with a warning: “The little town of Mosinee made this experiment for 24 
hours, a public service to ALL America. It can‟t happen here? Well, this is what it looks 
like....IF IT SHOULD!”
2
(The Atomic Café). 
Whether described as “robots,” “cogs,” “cannon fodder,” “atoms,” or “masses 
with a capital M,” to most Americans the Russian people seemed fated to be stripped of 
their identities, and the Soviet Union as a whole reduced to a regimented “country of the 
blind.” 
At the movies, the obsession with Soviet-like conformity and regimentation was 
reflected in the slew of alien invasion, “we‟ll-all-be-zombies” films of the early 1950‟s. 
These two-hour flirtations with doom featured Martians, sea monsters, and giant insects 
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serving as direct stand-ins for Communists. Cold, calculating and completely lacking in 
emotion, these creatures showed the same robot-like traits that were said to plague 
Stalin‟s subjects and, as the movies delighted in pointing out, Americans were 
vulnerable to them (Savage 37). 
The Thing from Another World (1951), Them! (1954), Invaders from Mars (1953), 
and Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) are prominent examples of the numerous 
anti-communist/anti-conformist films of the pod and blob variety. The Thing is a giant 
man-eating creature resembling a carrot that crash lands at the North Pole in a flying 
saucer and before long is devouring men and dogs as it reproduces at will. While the 
Thing appears to be a part of the natural world, a kind of super-vegetable, film historian 
Peter Biskind has pointed out that its behavior more resembles that of a robot than an 
animal. Like a machine, the Thing feels no pain, has no emotions, and is not restrained 
by moral principles. Them!, one of Warner Brothers highest grossing movies of 1954, 
features giant homicidal ants that run amok in the Los Angeles sewer system. A 
scientist explains that “ants are savage, ruthless, and courageous fighters...the only 
creatures on earth aside from man who make war....Chronic aggressors, they make 
slaves of those they can‟t kill.” It is also repeated that the ingenious ants (like Martians) 
have an unsettling talent for “social organization.” If ants are like humans it is obvious 
which people Americans regarded as the most antlike. (Though filmed in black and 
white, the theatrical release featured a technicolor opening title, the word “Them!”, 
hurtled towards the audience in vibrant Commie-red.)  The political allegory of Them!, 
“anty-Communism,” is carried a step further in the nightmarish Invaders from Mars 
(1953). This is the story of a small boy who knows that Martians are kidnapping 
prominent citizens and implanting crystals in their brains which will drive them to commit 
treasonous acts. The Martians and the programmed Earthlings are all under the control 
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of the same leader—a disembodied silver head inside a plastic fish bowl who gives 
orders like a commissar—they are “slaves to his will.” Worst of all, by assuming human 
form, the clever Martians are insidiously normal; like real Reds, the spaced-out folks 
must be ferreted out! In Body Snatchers, released three years later, humans actually 
become “hosts to an alien form of life.” Extra-terrestrial plant pods want “not just our 
bodies but our minds,” so the body snatchers are “taking us over cell by cell” (Sayre 
201).  The Thing, the ants, the Martians and the pods multiply rapidly. The beings they 
create are interchangeable members of a mechanistic mass society; devoid or robbed of 
their souls they lack any sense of emotion or stamp of individuality. Significantly, the 
alien creatures are also technologically advanced, except for the giant ants which we 
learn are the mutant by-products of atomic testing. They are all, in the purest sense, the 
New Soviet Man. 
By the early 1950s, movie-goers watched heads in fish tanks and queen ants 
direct the creation of a world too horrible for Americans to even contemplate. In the real 
world USSR, Americans believed, such mindless mass behavior already existed, and 
the Soviet octopus was purportedly reaching out for more. What kind of people were 
behind all this? 
Americans had always sensed that Communists were not “normal,” not natural, 
just not right; and during the early Cold War era, some writers suspected Soviet leaders 
and many of their most fanatical followers of being mentally unbalanced, even crazy. By 
the late 1940‟s, hundreds of crazed Soviets were showing up in American films, novels, 
and comic books as well. Out of the more than fifty anti-Communist films that flooded 
from Hollywood‟s movie studios between 1948 and 1953, Nora Sayre writes that one of 
her favorite “mad scenes” appears in Republic‟s Red Menace (1949). The segment 
features a Communist woman in Washington, D.C., who is beset by imaginary 
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drumbeats while being politely questioned by the Department of Justice. The Red 
functionary shrieks, “You‟re too late!....Our ammunition is already here.” The soundtrack 
starts pounding as we too begin to hear drums. “The legions—they‟re entering the city. 
In a few minutes they‟ll be here.” The drums rumble even louder. “Hear them!” she 
laughs deliriously. “You fools! Don‟t you hear them?!” As she is led out of the room 
cackling, one puzzled FBI agent says to the other, “We only wanted her statement for 
clarification” (Sayre 51). The main villain in Mickey Spillane‟s One Lonely Night 
(published in 1951, it sold more than three million copies) is also an insane lackey of 
Uncle Joe‟s. Just before he chokes him to death, Mike Hammer tells this master killer, 
Oscar Deamer: “You were a Commie, Oscar, because you were batty. It was the only 
philosophy that would appeal to your crazy mind. It justified everything you did and you 
saw a chance of getting back at the world” (quoted in Whitfield 36). Once again, the 
seeming explanation for Communism‟s appeal is insanity.  
Joseph Stalin himself was usually portrayed less as a raving kook than as an 
extremely evil and paranoid murderer, constantly coming up with new and often “mad” 
measures of securing his own personal safety. In shocking portrayals such as Arthur 
Koestler‟s novels Darkness at Noon (1941) and The Yogi and the Commissar (1946), 
Americans had read blood-curdling accounts of a seemingly crazed, purge-happy Stalin 
of the 1930‟s. Articles such as Saturday Review’s “In Soviet Inferno; Russian Purges” 
(1952) and Scholastic’s “Red Russia: By Trial and Terror” (1953) did little to improve the 
image of the postwar Stalin. For the Saturday Review, such “random” slaughter only 
made sense to Stalin on one principle: “„If you want to make your enemies afraid, begin 
by cutting off the heads of your friends‟” (Wolfe 13-14). That Stalin himself was 
extremely fearful seemed a given to the American public.  Journalists from the United 
States frequently reported that Moscow was being converted into an armed camp “with 
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soldiers carrying tommy-guns on almost every street corner,” and that Stalin had 
deployed look-alikes of himself all over the city to thwart any would-be assassins (“Red 
Russia” 13-15).  What seemed even more peculiar was the extent to which Stalin had 
apparently sealed himself off from the outside world. In A Window on Red Square 
(1953), Frank Rounds, an American Embassy official in Moscow, typically asserted that 
“Nothing is known about Stalin and his inner circle by anybody in Moscow or by anybody 
anywhere else.” Rounds added that no previous dictator had ever set up such an 
“abnormal way for himself or his people,” and that “there has never before been 
anything like this on earth” (88). In short, Stalin was completely different from other 
totalitarian despots because, as the Saturday Evening Post put it, he was “completely 
unrecognizable as a man” (Smith 20). 
American images of the USSR were often simplistic, one-sided and charged with 
emotion. The Soviets had some impressive accomplishments to their credit: no ten 
years in the history of any Western nation ever showed a rate of economic growth as 
dramatic as the decade of the first two five year plans (1928-1938); an energetic 
campaign against illiteracy was carried out successfully throughout the USSR; a national 
medical program set up which benefited the entire population; and the Soviet Union had 
somewhat miraculously driven back the massive German onslaught of World War II 
and, despite tremendous losses, was on the road to economic recovery. These and 
other apparent pluses of Soviet rule, however, were almost never acknowledged in mid-
century America. In 1951, a United Nations survey of eight Western countries asked 
respondents to describe their attitudes toward the Russians. The UN found that 
Americans regarded themselves as the “least friendly” with 91.1% “Unfavorable” and 
0.9% “Favorable” ratings; significantly, no other people, not even Russia‟s enemies of 
World War II, responded with such clear animosity (Buchanan and Cantril 83).  In the 
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United States in particular, reports on Soviet life tended to highlight those aspects which 
were most repulsive to the public and to minimize those which might have seemed more 
acceptable. The outcome was an overall set of images which negated and even 
reversed American values and visions of an “American way of life.” Still, in some 
respects, the images of life under Red rule remained a somewhat intangible set of ideas 
until they received expression in Nineteen Eighty-Four (published in 1949), the anti-
Utopian novel by English socialist George Orwell. For serious scholars and the general 
public alike, 1984 provided a model of Stalinist totalitarianism—combining the most 
terrifying Soviet images into one hideous nightmare. 
When Orwell‟s book was published in the United States in 1949, it gained a vast 
popular as well as intellectual following. 1984 was chosen as a Book of the Month Club 
selection, was condensed in Reader’s Digest for its September 1949 issue, and quickly 
became a required course reading in universities and schools. The novel was a runaway 
best-seller, selling 400,000 copies in its first year and eleven million copies by the early 
1970‟s (Mitter and Major 147). In his essay, “America‟s View of George Orwell,” political-
scientist John P. Rossi notes that 1984 won Orwell a larger following in the United 
States than in his homeland, and that, while some English critics initially blasted the 
work as unbelievably gloomy or as an ideological “superweapon of the Cold War,” there 
were virtually no negative reactions or reviews in the United States (Rossi 574). 
According to Orwell‟s biographer and friend George Woodcock—and several 
other contemporary critics—the subject of 1984 was not intended to be just Soviet 
Russia but Western industrial nations as well, including the United States. Woodcock 
insists that, first and foremost, 1984 was written as a satire (even “caricature”) of 
modern society (Woodcock 218). But, regardless of Orwell‟s intentions, most Americans 
chose to receive the book as a realistic portrayal of life in the Soviet Union. In Reader’s 
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Digest‟s September 1949 reprint from Life magazine, Life‟s editors identified the 
character of Big Brother as a “mating” of Stalin and Hitler, and noted that London was 
an obvious substitute for the novel‟s real setting—Russia. “Behind the iron curtain,” they 
insisted, Orwell‟s dystopia “will not seem strange or imaginative at all.” The Life 
commentary expressed one concern: that the book was, in fact, “so good, so full of 
excitement and horror, that there is some danger of its message being ignored” (156). 
Nicholas Prychodko likewise warned readers of Moscow’s Drive for World Domination 
that Orwell‟s vision was “no fantasy, but a clear preview of what is entirely possible. 
Read that book and decide for yourself whether you want to be involved in that second 
billion to fall on your knees before the throne of Stalin!” (72).  
For these and many other reviewers, 1984 was not viewed as a partly real, partly 
unreal vision, but as a direct attack on the system already existing in the Communist 
world. Given this general reaction it is hardly surprising that, almost immediately, the 
terms coined by Orwell—”Newspeak,” “Mutability of the Past,” “Ministry of Truth,” 
“Thought Police,” “Crime-think,” “Double-think,” and the well-known caption “Big Brother 
is Watching You”—began showing up everywhere in American newspaper articles and 
speeches on the subject of the USSR. Appearing just as the Cold War reached its 
zenith, Orwell‟s “inverted utopian” vision gave substance to “the nightmares that 
obsess...millions of men and women who are too inarticulate to put their fears into 
words” (Walsh 134). 1984‟s nightmarish picture of totalitarianism was confirmed daily in 
reports on the USSR by America‟s press, and in popular culture. To Americans in the 
post-war decade, it appeared that if this frozen, anti-natural apocalypse where one‟s 
every action was monitored and controlled by the state, had not already been realized 
its arrival could not long be delayed. The Soviet Union “was the enemy, absolute and 
evil in the best Orwellian tradition” (Blumoff 7). 
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“Red Dawn” in America 
As the paranoid nature of the nightmare images of the USSR would suggest, 
reflective Americans were feeling uneasy during the early postwar era.  Many were 
beginning to question, if only subconsciously, some of the central assumptions of their own 
culture as they became more and more bewildered by the deep social and political changes 
at work in the twentieth century. As Norman Mailer wrote in 1964, “Obviously we were afraid 
of something more than Communists” (quoted in Field 6). Against the backdrop of a terrible 
Second World War, the extermination of six million Jews in the Holocaust, the construction 
and use of the atomic bomb, and the beginning of the Cold War (the outcome of which 
could not be predicted with any certainty), Americans of the early postwar era were 
increasingly doubtful about the innate rationality and goodness of man, inevitable progress, 
the plausibility of freedom, and the benefits of science
3
. 
On the domestic front, many Americans were increasingly convinced that that 
modern technology, industry, government bureaucracy and the mass media were sapping 
citizens of their freedom and individualism and forcing American culture into a homogenized 
mass of conformity, and that, overall, America‟s best days were behind her and the worst 
was yet to come. It is no mere coincidence that Americans‟ most prominent and harrowing 
inner fears about the future mirror, almost exactly, their overt images of contemporary life in 
the USSR. 
Popular fiction and commentaries from the era indicate that many were disturbed by 
the startling scientific and technological events that occurred in the middle of the twentieth 
century—particularly the creation of the atomic bomb and the computer. Historian Robert J. 
Lifton has argued convincingly that the A-bomb forced Americans to question one of their 
most deeply held convictions: that scientific discoveries would bring about progress (Lifton 
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338). Anxieties about the bomb were channeled into a fantasy culture in science-fiction films 
and popular magazine stories portraying an atomic apocalypse. In January 1952, Galaxy 
Science Fiction‟s editor reported that over 90 percent of recent stories submitted to the 
journal dealt with atomic or bacteriological warfare, devolution, or mutant children (Gilbert 
171). New York Times Magazine similarly feared that “No matter what shape it may 
assume,” the atomic future “will be an uncomfortable place for the individual,” for “this new 
source of energy….must increase enormously the power of the state over the citizen” 
(Boyer 147).  
Patricia Warrick writes in The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction that while 
twentieth-century American science-fiction had been generally optimistic, it became 
predominantly negative during the early stages of the Cold War. Tellingly in postwar fiction, 
the computer is always used to repress the masses. In some of the most terrifying sci-fi 
tales of the early fifties—including Jack Williamson‟s “With Folded Hands” (1947), Kurt 
Vonnegut‟s “Player Piano” (1952), and Bernard Wolfe‟s “Limbo” (1952)—computers take 
over closed societies and do away with love, creativity and imagination, turning the minds of 
their victims into virtual machines. At the same time, “the nostalgic longing to return to 
nature,” writes Warrick, “is a recurring element of the dystopian fiction” (146).  
In the Soviet Union, Americans believed, through total organization and power, the 
Soviet state had gained complete control over the actions of its people, be it in the factory or 
the slave labor camp. Utterly lacking any individual rights or freedoms, the Russian drones 
worked night and day, not for their own benefit or for that of future generations (as they 
were told), but instead to help calm the fears and satisfy the evil expansionist aims of their 
paranoid and unbalanced leaders in the Kremlin. The future worlds now being created in 
postwar fiction were parallel to that of Soviet Russia where the Gosplan and the MVD had 
supposedly used all means at their disposal to penetrate “into every corner of the home of a 
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Soviet citizen” intruding “authoritatively and unceremoniously into his bedroom, kitchen, 
meal pots, his coffers and at last, but not least, into his brain, soul and liver” (Russia 
Magazine, 1947). Only now all this Big Brotherism was effectively enhanced with computer 
technology. Was the United States in danger of following a similar path at the hands of 
faceless technocrats?  
Overall, the primary anxiety of the age was that modern Americans were being held 
hostage by ultimately inhuman institutions and values which crushed their most basic 
desires for freedom of will and action. This new fear was the fear of determinism and its 
closely related ally, the fear of conformity.  
By the close of the 1940s there was considerable talk about the widespread 
acceptance of blandness, phoniness, and the general pressures of conformity. As Henry 
Miller aptly phrased it, America was usually portrayed as an “air-conditioned nightmare” 
(quotation in Hartstone 174). The daily experience of most Americans was, without 
question, with an increasingly homogenized culture. Just as the merger movement of the 
1890s had led to nationally recognized name brands, and the automobile craze of the 1920s 
had helped bring about a decline of regional differences, the forties brought a new large 
dose of cultural uniformity. The mid-century years had seen rapid technological change, 
standardization, bureaucratization, and gigantism, and, in their desperate, even hysterical 
desire to find security in a very threatening world, Americans appeared to have retreated 
into an ultimately boring mass culture. Indeed, conformity seemed to pervade all aspects of 
life. In John Keats‟ best-seller, The Crack in the Picture Window (1956), the shallow, fearful 
American of the 1950s was described in the following passage: “He read books to make 
conversation, listened to music to establish his social position, chose his clothes for the 
impression they would make on his business associates, entertained his friends in order to 
get ahead, and held the affection of his wife and children only by continuous bribery” (Keats 
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quoted in Perret 302). Charles Morris‟ The Open Self (1948) likewise identified the problems 
of maintaining an open society under modern conditions. In discussing personal 
relationships, Morris described the object of conversation as no longer being that of thought 
or humor but agreement—contradiction and cynicism were considered in bad taste. There 
were some communities, he noted, where simply wearing a beard would cause a stir, where 
bearded strangers were frequently asked by local police for identification (see Perret 297-
298). One anti-conformist publication reported that even Superman had become a cause for 
concern. A 1949 interview on comic book heroes quotes a twelve-year old girl as saying: “I 
like Superman better than others because they can‟t do everything Superman can do. 
Batman can‟t fly and that is very important. Question. Would you like to be able to fly? 
Answer. I would like to be able to fly if everybody else did, but otherwise it would be kind of 
conspicuous.” This girl‟s fear of flying may have been well grounded. For most Americans it 
was said to be better to fit in than to stand out, better to be average and safe than special 
and sorry (Riesman 105). Paradoxically, however, Americans were not complacent about 
conformity. In fact they were deeply troubled by this phenomenon, and almost no one 
defended it (even Reader’s Digest was critical) or wanted to be accused of it even if they 
knew it was true. This fear of the dangers of the other-directed self and the herd instinct, 
one of democracy‟s oldest bugaboos, dated back to Alexis de Tocqueville‟s concerns of a 
tyranny of the majority in the 1830s and emerged in popular novels such as Sinclair Lewis‟s 
Babbitt in the 1920s. But during the postwar era this anxiety became particularly troubling. 
The links between American fears of conformity and their images of life in the Soviet 
Union are obvious. The average Russian had reportedly become an “absolute conformist” in 
the purest sense—a dull, obedient, soldier, completely void of any sense of personal 
identity. Defector Andrey Olkhovsky had asked: “What is more important, man or the 
system which enslaves him, the personal or the impersonal, the spiritual or the material?” 
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(Olkhovsky 276). In the USSR these questions were all said to have been answered 
wrongly, with terrifying results; now, it seemed, similar responses were taking shape in 
modern American life as well. In a plethora of anti-conformist 1950s publications such as 
The Lonely Crowd, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, and The Organization Man, 
Americans read examinations of dehumanizing corporate situations that forced middle class 
men to be other-directed “organization men” locked into the new worship of “togetherness” 
and “group think” and cajoled into altering their own behavior in response to the pressures 
of the larger community. Their families lived in bland suburbias, rows “of identical boxes 
spreading like gangrene” that had been “vomited up” across the countryside and given 
names like “Park Forest”, “Sweet Hollow,” and “Crystal Stream”—whilst in reality the trees 
which once grew there had been cut down, the hollows filled in, and the streams polluted 
with “stinking refuse” (Keats xi, xii).  Millions of Americans feared that they were witnessing 
their individualism slipping away in a nation of increasing uniformity, phoniness and 
“bigness”. Just how far this trend would continue in their own country no one knew for sure, 
but that it would continue seemed certain. 
Obsessions with conformity in early Cold War America were bolstered by the belief 
that the human personality could be easily manipulated. A serious academic literature was 
established on the subject of “brainwashing”—the effectiveness of which seemed to be 
confirmed by stories that American POW‟s in Korea had had their fundamental values and 
beliefs changed by such techniques (a perception further enhanced with the release of films 
such as The Manchurian Candidate, a few years later). The field of communications 
research had been developed by intellectuals intrigued by the impact of Nazi and, later, 
Soviet propaganda. Many American liberals grew increasingly concerned about the growing 
public relations industry and the influential powers of advertising, including subliminal 
messages. 
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For the most part, Americans saw little in the historical past to put their minds at 
ease about the future. There was another sort of past, however, that could be easily 
summoned by anyone willing to use their imaginations to go backward in time. The most 
prominent model for an alternative lifestyle was the mythic Old West—a region that 
flourished with a peculiar intensity in Cold War films, fiction, radio, television, and comics. 
Whether in its original orientation toward children, or in the „adult‟ Western that emerged in 
the 1950‟s, the Western was relevant drama which embodied the psychology of the East-
West struggle. It was there on that “virgin land” that all of the alleged rugged and simple 
truths of pre-industrial life—individualism, self-reliance, “know how” and higher values—
could be portrayed most effectively. In this age of deep social anxiety and international 
tension, the Western hero answered to a higher law, not bureaucratic red tape, and offered 
straight solutions. The cowboy is left completely free with open options and no ties as he 
roams a territory of endless space. This aspect of the Western was expounded upon by 
James Arness the star of Gunsmoke. “People like Westerns because they represent a time 
of freedom,” he told TV Guide in 1958. “That is why they tune in on Western shows to 
escape from conformity. They [presumably the male viewers] don‟t want to see a U.S. 
Marshal come home and help his wife wash the dishes” (quoted in MacDonald, Who Shot 
the Sheriff? 75). John W. Evans agrees in his article “Modern Man and the Cowboy.” Evans 
points out that the adult Western hero has no boss and is not a mere cog in some huge and 
impersonal organization; rather, the cowboy stands alone and independent. Furthermore, 
“through his vicarious position in the powerful and final act of the gunfight,” writes Evans, 
“the factory worker or the organization man symbolically shoots down all the individual 
officials and impersonal forces that restrict, schedule, supervise, direct, frustrate and control 
his daily existence” (Evans 36).  At its height, as many as 60 million viewers per night 
watched the television Westerns and, by January 1959, eight of the top ten programs were 
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of that genre (McDonald 138).
4
 The Western story‟s pervasiveness during the postwar era, 
is indicative of Americans‟ obsessive fear of conformity and determinism, the desire for 
simple answers in difficult times, and an overall urge to withdraw from civilization‟s growing 
complexity. 
Americans‟ images of their foe reflected not only their fears of Soviet power, but also 
demonstrated their distaste for modern society. Despite a relatively easy time for the United 
States during World War II, there was a strong sense of doom in victory. The war itself had 
repeatedly displayed the extremes of human cruelty. Mass society, atomic warfare, 
propaganda, and totalitarianism became words infused with fear and urgency. In the years 
immediately following the war it appeared that government bureaucracy, big corporations, 
and new technologies such as the modern mass media were turning American culture into a 
homogenized mass that was smothering individualism and preparing the way for a new kind 
of social order. In this disturbing milieu, Americans transferred their deepest fears onto their 
hated rival. 
Without fully understanding recent societal changes, many Americans of the 1947-
1953 period also held on to their visions of an earlier age. (The ironies of this dependence 
were obvious. The amazing spectacle of millions of Americans re-living the “frontier days” 
replete with “natural” role models—all with the aid of the advanced techniques of mass 
communication—is worthy of a Mencken.) The fact that these idealized images of an older 
America were repeatedly counterpoised against the negative images of modern life—which 
the Soviet Union came to symbolize—was indicative of Americans‟ desperate attempt 
during anxious times to define themselves as a people and a nation. In the American mind, 
the canyon separating the Old American West from the New Soviet East stretched as far as 
the imagination could reach. If Americans were comfortable with their visions of “the West 
as America” it would also appear that, in their images of the Soviet Union, they had created 
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an opposite definition of themselves revealing their deepest fears and anxieties about the 
future of their own society. 
Since the end of the Cold War, almost two decades ago, other American enemies 
have appeared including Libya, Panamanian drug lords, Iraq and al Qaeda, just to name a 
few; but none has taken on an image as nightmarish or pervasive as that of “Red Russia” 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In American eyes, the Soviet Union was viewed as 
the incarnation of the most troubling features of mid-twentieth century life. Given the 
Soviets‟ association with enormous concentrations of power, total state control over the 
individual, and with the concerted effort to place machines and production over human 
needs or values, it is not at all surprising that the USSR aroused some of Americans‟ 
deepest fears and anxieties during the early postwar era. As the Reverend Billy Graham 
told Americans at an evangelical rally in 1953: “Almost all ministers of the gospel and 
students of the Bible agree that it [Communism] is master-minded by Satan himself” 
(Whitfield 81). The images of Soviet life were not, of course, bought into by all Americans 
and some had their own personal reasons for holding intense, negative attitudes toward the 
Soviet state. But the images do reveal general cultural concerns. For much of the American 
public, the dystopian images served two purposes. First, in a postwar world of bewildering 
complexity, it was comfortable and flattering to see the world in simple terms of good versus 
evil. Second, at a deeper level, the images prophesized the dangers that many believed 
faced their own society in the postwar world. Americans would need to be vigilant to 
preclude these threats and prevent the destruction of what they perceived as their own 
“traditional” ways of life. 
 
 
 
  24 
Acknowledgements 
 
David A. Smith is a librarian and PhD student in History at the University of Saskatchewan 
in Saskatoon, Canada. He thanks Professor Brian W. Dippie of the University of Victoria 
and librarian colleague Ken Whiteway of the University of Saskatchewan for their invaluable 
recommendations and edits to this article. The author would like to express particular 
gratitude to his inspiring mentor and friend, the late Professor Ted Wooley of the University 
of Victoria, for his thoughtful guidance, advice, and sharing of his extensive knowledge of 
the Cold War era. 
 
 
Works Cited 
Alexiev, Nina I. “I Didn‟t Want My Children to Grow Up in Soviet Russia,” Reader’s Digest 
(June 1947): 11-16. 
 
Atkinson, Brooks. “Russia 1946.” Life (July 22, 1946): 85-94. 
 
The Atomic Café. Thorn Emi Video, 1982. 
 
Barson, Michael and Steven Heller. Red Scared! The Commie Menace in Propoganda and 
Popular Culture. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001. 
 
Biskind, Peter. Seeing Is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Fifties. New York: Pantheon, 1983. 
 
Blumoff, T.Y. “Popular Fiction and the Creation of the Cold War Consensus, 1943-1952.” 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Louis, 1976. 
 
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic 
Age. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 
 
Buchanan, William and Hadley Cantril. How Nations See Each Other: A Study of Public 
Opinion. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1953. 
 
Buckingham, Peter H. America Sees Red: Anti-Communism in America, 1870s to 1980s. 
Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1988. 
 
Counts, George S. and Nucia P. Lodge. The Country of the Blind: The Soviet System of 
Mind Control: Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949. 
 
Drake, Ann Montgomery. “Russians in Hungary.” America (March 1, 1947): 602-604. 
 
Eastman, Max. “The Truth About Soviet Russia‟s 14,000,000 Slaves.” Reader’s Digest (April 
1947): 139-146. 
 
Evans, John W. “Modern Man and the Cowboy,” Television Quarterly (May 1962): 34-36. 
 
Field, Douglas. American Cold War Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005. 
  25 
 
Fillmore, Robin L. Transforming the “Enemy”: A Discursive Analysis of U.S. Images of the 
Soviet Union. PhD dissertation in Political Science. Kent State University, Ohio. May 
2006. 
 
Fried, Richard M. “Springtime for Stalin in Mosinee.” The Russians Are Coming! The 
Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America. Richard M. 
Fried. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 67-86. 
 
Gilbert, James. Another Chance: Postwar America: 1945-1985. Chicago: Dorsey Press, 
1986. 
 
Hartshorne, Thomas L. The Distorted Image: Changing Conceptions of the American 
Character Since Turner. Cleveland: Case Western University Press, 1968. 
 
Inkeles, Alex. Public Opinion in Soviet Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1950. 
 
Keats, John. The Crack in the Picture Window. Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1956. 
 
Kennan, George F. “Mr. X.” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs (April 1951): 
351-370. 
 
Kirk, Lydia. “Postmarked Moscow.” Reader’s Digest (November 1952): 135-146. 
 
Lifton, Robert J. Broken Connections: On Death and the Continuity of Life. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1979. 
 
MacDonald, J. Fred. Television and the Red Menace: The Video Road to Vietnam.  New 
York: Praeger, 1985. 
 
----------. Who Shot the Sheriff? The Rise and Fall of the Television Western. New York: 
Praeger, 1987. 
 
Metz, Howard W. and A.H. Thomson. Authoritarianism and the Individual. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1950. 
 
Mitter, Rana and Patrick Major. Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History. 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass and Co., 2004. 
 
Nevins, Allen. “Stalin Can‟t Win: A Top Historian Proves Tyrannies Must Fall.” Collier’s 
(October 20, 1951): 16-19, 80-81. 
 
Olkhovsky, Andrey. Music Under the Soviets: The Agony of an Art. New York: Praeger, 
1955. 
 
Perret, Geoffrey. A Dream of Greatness: The American People, 1945-1963. New York: 
Coward, McCann and Geogheghan, 1979. 
 
  26 
“Preview of the War We Do Not Want.” Special Issue of Collier’s (October 27, 1951). 
 
Prychodko, Nicholas. Moscow’s Drive for World Domination. Free World Publishing, 
1951. 
 
 “Red Russia: Rule by Trial and Terror.” Scholastic (February 11, 1953): 13-15. 
 
Riesman, David L. The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. 
Garden City, NY: 1950.  
 
Rossi, John P. “America‟s View of George Orwell.” Review of Politics (1981): 572-581. 
 
Rounds, Frank. A Window on Red Square. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. 
 
Savage, William W. Comic Books and America, 1945-1954. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1990. 
 
Sayre, Nora. Running Time: Films of the Cold War. New York: Dial Press, 1982. 
 
Seed, David. American Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and Film. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999. 
 
Sharp, Joanne P. Condensing the Cold War: Reader‟s Digest and American Identity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
 
Smith, Walter Bedell. “What Kind of Man Is Stalin?” Saturday Evening Post (November 12, 
1949): 19-21. 
 
Them! Warner Brothers Pictures, 1954. 
 
Walsh, Chad. From Utopia to Nightmare. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1972. 
 
Warrick, Patricia S. The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction. Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 1980.  
 
Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996. 
 
Wolfe, Bertram D. “In Soviet Inferno; Russian Purges.” Saturday Review (February 9, 
1952): 13-14. 
 
Woodcock, George. The Crystal Spirit: A Study of George Orwell. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1966. 
 
 
 
  27 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 Studies which present a case counter to my own include: William L. O‟Neill, American High: 
The Years of Confidence, 1945-1960 (New York: Free Press, 1986); and John Brooks, The 
Great Leap: The Past Twenty-Five Years in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). 
 
2
 The American Legion film is shown in part in The Atomic Café (1982); for an in-depth description 
of this staged event see “Springtime for Stalin in Mosinee” in Fried 67-86. 
 
3
 For a concise summary of early postwar anxieties see Boyer 149. 
 
4
 Nielson U.S. television-ratings for January 1959: 
1. Gunsmoke; 2. Have Gun Will Travel; 3. The Rifleman; 4. Wagon Train; 5. The Danny Thomas 
Show (comedy); 6. The Real McCoys (comedy); 7. Tales of Wells Fargo; 8. Maverick; 9. The Life 
and Legend of Wyatt Earp; and 10. Zane Grey Theater. Source: MacDonald 139. 
